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NSA review completed

# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
D/DCI/NIPE 7E 22	15 Mar.
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15 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

SUBJECT: Program Managers' Review Group

George:

The Program Managers' Review Group (PMRG) is meeting at NSA these days and we have a representative sitting in on it--  
[redacted] Early this month, [redacted] Chairman PMRG, set up a PMRG Task Force for Vietnam. This group was tasked to prepare "select program information to assist the PMRG in developing its recommendations [redacted] in South Vietnam below those currently programmed for the FY's 73 through 77." After two meetings, according to [redacted] the group folded, primarily because the military representatives could not concur that MACV's requirements would diminish over the reporting period.


I am attaching a memorandum from [redacted] distributed to PMRG members, giving his philosophy [redacted] This background should be useful to you as the committee gets into its work, but I would appreciate your not revealing to the committee your access to this memorandum. Please let me have it back when it has served its purpose.

[redacted]  
Bronson Tweedy  
D/DCI/NIPE

Attachment

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# Memorandum

WIRE  
CCF/PMRG  
9 MAR 71

TO : Chief B  
THRU : ADP  
FROM : Chairman PMRG

DATE:

SUBJECT: Program Reduction in Vietnam

1. The pending reduction of U.S. forces in Vietnam dictates that we develop a SIGINT program for that area taking into consideration the necessity, feasibility and indeed the desirability of continuing some of our current operations. When the total U.S. strength in Vietnam reaches the FY-73 ceiling of 43,400 or the FY-74 level of 25,700 it is difficult to envisage 5 or 6 thousand SIGINT personnel being required in country. There are arguments being advanced that MACV has not reduced his requirements for SIGINT support for the time in question. However, the requirements for direct support cannot continue full bore when the strike forces being supported have returned to the Z.I. or some base away from Vietnam. Unless there is some real change in roles and missions there is no charge against ASA to provide direct support to ARVN units. Therefore, some reduction in resources devoted to tactical collection and processing is possible.

2. The role of U.S. manned ARDF platforms is quite unclear after withdrawal of our fighting forces. What is the requirement to provide U.S. manned ARDF support to the ARVN and how can it realistically be accomplished? The number of fields from which light aircraft can stage, the linguistic barrier between U.S. pilots and ARVN fighting forces, the difference in communications capabilities, the problem of feeding raw COMINT data to ARVN units, etc. are all details that point toward a drawdown. It may even be both feasible and desirable to let the ARVN assume the entire ARDF job, or that portion that is required post 73, using the 20 platforms being turned over by the Air Force. At any rate something alot less than what ASA/AFSS now are doing in the ARDF business should be our goal by end FY-73/74.

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3. In preparing a phase down program we must consider the overall U.S. role in Vietnam for the period under consideration. When U.S. strength gets down to the 25700 mark the main effort is to be a MAAG composed of around 17000 people. If we add to that the roughly 6000 advocated for SIGINT, there isn't much left to provide protection to our cryptologic activities. The number of sites we can man and the level of material held or processed must be relatable to our capability to protect and support the sites.

4. The U.S. Army strength for FY-73 and beyond will be reduced to approximately 800,000 troops compared with the 1,300,000 now in uniform. This constitutes a drastic reduction in Army personnel and the reduction is based mainly upon withdrawal from Vietnam and a volunteer Army. There is no reason to expect that the SIGINT community is not going to get a share of this decrease, in fact, past actions by DA indicate that ASA will undoubtedly be assessed for a share of the cut. Under these conditions if we program full strength for Vietnam we will have to cut deeply in other areas and run the risk of losing both the billets we cut now and those tied to any future directed reduction in Vietnam.

5. Based on the foregoing set of facts/assumptions, I would like to have B Group, working with the SCA's develop a phase down program that reduces our Vietnam commitment by about 1500 billets by end FY-73 and around 3000 by end FY-74. The phase down program should be available for study by the PMRG by 24 Mar 71.

6. Please call upon me if my staff can be of any assistance in this action or if additional guidance/clarification is desired.

  
Chairman, Program Managers Review Group

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PMRG Members (25)